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ABSTRACT

Humanities and social science education are increasingly influenced by controversy over different conceptions of scientific thinking. The basic conflict is between those who view science as being objectively based and those who see scientific work as being based upon personal and societal variants such as values, feelings, and needs. The debate between value-free and value-laden research has been particularly strong in fields of social science, the humanities, and education. A growing body of writers is demanding that the educational system concern itself with social and economic problems. For example, Willis Harman suggests in his book, "Alternative Futures and Educational Policies," that educational policy must be totally reevaluated. Victor Perkiss suggests in "The Future of Technological Civilization" that a new type of ecological humanism is necessary for human survival. Several theories which have been developed to help educators transmit values emphasize morale building and leadership skills, belief in the relativity of values, individualism, and the conviction that values are formed by interaction of an individual with the environment. Several moral reasoning approaches based on these theories are widely used in schools, including values clarification, Kohlberg's theory of moral development, the Allen Environmental-Moral Reasoning Model, and the Coombs-Meux Moral Reasoning Model. The conclusion is that educational pedagogy will become increasingly value-based in the future. It is recommended, consequently, that educators use values education to help students choose between positive values and useless cultural traditions which impede development. (DB)

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VALUES EDUCATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF A "NEW PEDAGOGY" IN THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

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The Crisis of Technological Society and the Need for 'New' Value Models

It has been more than thirty years since George Counts wrote his influential essay "Dare the School Build a New Social Order?" where he called for an educational system which would be closely linked to social and intellectual changes and would play a major role in contributing to the alleviation of some of mankind's social and economic problems. Since Count's time a generation of 'radical educational critics' have tried to make their readers aware of the inadequacy and failure of institutional education and have sustained Count's appeals for an education which deals with societal issues and human concerns.[1] More recently, a growing body of 'futuristically' inclined writers from all the major disciplines have also created a substantial literature on the critical problems facing mankind in this decade and have called on the educational system to concern itself directly with issues such as environmental pollution, over-consumption, the quality of life and the depletion of natural resources.[2]

Willis Harman has even suggested that modern educational practice should become seriously involved with eliminating 'pathogenic values' which would destroy the existence of life on earth and has asked for a total re-evaluation of educational policy. Harman sees the school as becoming deeply concerned with the propagation of 'new values' which would permit students to reconsider culturally determined beliefs which could be detrimental to the survival of the

human race.[3] Confirming this position the political scientist Victor Ferkiss has pointed out that industrial societies require new 'value models' to survive rapidly changing world conditions. For Ferkiss,

> "The modern age has been distinguished by two essential characteristics. In the intellectual sphere modernity has involved the growth of rationalism and the attempt to understand and conquer nature through mathematical reason: this rationalism has been accompanied by an emphasis on the dualism between mind and body and between humanity and individual level and of tradition and community at the social level. In the physical realm, modernization has been characterized by the unlimited growth of human population and the unlimited of human artifice - of technology - upon the earth and by the creation of a worldwide technological society."[4]

In his analysis of the emerging 'planetary society' and the ideological bankruptcy of our 'outmoded' value models, Ferkiss has constructed a new political and social paradigm which might have serious implications for the future development of our corporate and educational structures. Ferkiss suggests that the 'new technological man' in opposition to the 'bourgeois man' of liberal society has to carefully consider three synthesizing principles in his view of technological society - naturalism, holism and immanentism. 'Naturalism' refers to the assumption that man is part of nature and must invariably make decisions in accordance with this fact. 'holism' emphasizes that everything in the universe is interconnected and integrated into a single system and 'immanentism' suggests that any grand restructuring or reordering can never come from external sources alone, but must come out of what already exists. 'Ecological humanism' is the term that Ferkiss applies to this new philosophy

which is necessary for man's survival on this planet and which stresses at all times that man is part of nature and not opposed to it. Only a redefinition of man's relation to the universe, man's relationship to himself and an articulation of the political and social ideologies behind these assumptions can lead us toward the kinds of 'new values' which must be fostered in a future society.[5]

A major body of educational theory loosely called "reconstruction" has attempted to create the framework for future educators, administrators and teachers to promote educational values which they might consider significant. Shimahara conceptualizes a 'transformative' psycho-cultural orientation which differs considerably from the traditional Parsonian model of 'sociological functionalism'. According to this theory the most significant element lies in 'the transactional interplay between the individual and culture.[6] In this view culture is seen as something modifiable "because individuals can alter cultural forces to make them congenial."[7] Heavily influenced by John Dewey this view of education stresses the actual perception of the individual in determining change.

> "Trouble with traditional education was not that it emphasized the external conditions that enter into control of experiences but that it paid so little attention to the internal factors which also decide what kind of experience is bad."[8]

This attempt to create a 'transformative orientation' stems largely from critical awareness of major human crises, since many of the problems of survival have become exacerbated on this planet in the last twenty years, including ecological crises, over-production,

irrational over-consumption, the destruction of nature, the over-exploitation of natural resources and overpopulation. Shimahara points out that our education has failed miserably in that individuals are unable to identify with some of these major issues but only with their own personal affairs and surroundings. Commenting on the future of society he points out, "In general pessimism tends to overshadow optimism, for schools have failed to become a frontier for social change, and education in general has long been regarded as an agent playing passive cultural roles within the framework of sociological functionalism."[9]

Why is this 'transformative psychocultural orientation'm which attempts to shape 'new values' in the educational process, necessary? For Brameld our planet does not have the luxury of choice about its education since serious technological and humanistic problems make it imperative that a 'reconstructed' educational force deal with a 'new' way of sustaining educational activities. Brameld sees 'non-educators' such as Saul Alinsky and Ralph Nader as prime examples of this new kind of educational force which will attempt to 'build for' something such as the 'city of man' and primary humanistic values. The theory and practice of contemporary values education might provide a curricular framework for educators in the humanities and social sciences to link their disciplines with the grave social, environmental and ethical problems facing Western society.[10]

Theoretical Perspectives on Values-Education

Though values-education is still in its infancy as a major educational movement, a substantial body of theoretical work exists from many of the major disciplines such as social psychology, religion, philosophy and sociology, which might provide the conceptual basis for the development of this kind of education. Some major theoretical justifications for a potential values-education include: The Organismic-Structural-Developmental View of Stewart, Piaget, Kohlberg and the Philosophical-Social Psychological View of Lawson and Phenix.

One of the most highly developed views on values-education is reflected in Stewart's writings on the subject.[11] Stewart points out that it is morally necessary to create a framework for a topic as controversial as values-education since any other view of such a complex topic represents only a set of highly subjective biases and prejudices.[12] Certainly, a conceptual framework does allow for a more integrated scientifically-based view than a set of 'opinions' about the subject. At the same time, a conceptual model will lead to some basis for future evaluation, a greater number of 'researchable hypotheses' and the possibility of "greater effectiveness, heightened efficiency and more enduring impact."[13]

Stewart distinguishes between four approaches to the problem of values-education:

1) The Traditional-Authoritarian Approach
2) The Cultural-Relativistic Approach
3) The Absolute-Relativist Approach
4) The Organismic-Structural-Developmental Approach

The first approach, 'The Traditional-Authoritarian Approach', is based on the belief in absolute values which have meaning apart from and extensive to man. Man exists to learn values which he must apply to his own life. These values become part of the traditional and symbolic structure of the society and individuals are required to respect them and fulfil them in their own lives. Man is a 'tabula rasa' through which society imprints values through indoctrination, sanctions, rewards or socialization figures such as parents, teachers, political leaders and the like. A neat division exists between what is 'good' and what is 'bad' and most socializing exists to propagate those tendencies on the 'good' side of the ledger. Stewart points out that greater or lesser versions of it may be observed in practice or in history by analyzing the socialization process of the Catholic Church and some forms of Communism, the Boy Scouts, institutional and fundamental sects in the U.S., the Ku Klux Klan and many schools throughout the world.[14] This approach to values is very similar philosophically to Butler's analysis of idealism where values are seen as permanent, transcendent and impermeable and truth is seen as absolute and fixed.[15]

The Cultural Relativist-Adjustment Approach has some similarities with the previous one, but with some major differences. One important detail is that values are seen as 'culturally relative' where members of a social system must learn to adapt to the normative standards of their own society. Thus, though values might be culturally relative they are 'absolute' for members of a particular society. Here, members of a society are socialized with traits such

as conformity, acceptance and adjustment. This approach has been greatly influenced by psychoanalytic traditions and cultural anthropology where man is seen as a creature in continuous conflict with himself to control his passions and repress his deepest needs in favour of conformity with society's standards. This approach was implemented in the late 1940's, 1950's and early 1960's and deeply influenced the Human Relations Movement of administration and management. Values-education of this type pays a great deal of attention to the submission of the individual to the group and the social necessity to conform within a society. Many business and industrial organizations have used these techniques to create a climate for 'morale building' and leadership skills.

The third view, the 'Absolute-Relativistic Approach', is the distinct outgrowth of certain tendencies in the 'existential' school which declared that all values are relative and that there are no absolute ethical principles or moral rules, "it is absolutely true that all values are relative."[16] Undoubtedly, the effects on many individuals of the horrors of two World Wars and the rise of humanism and existentialism led to this almost nihilistic denial of all 'values'. Novak, the social philosopher, has analyzed the historical origins and contemporary manifestations of this nihilistic philosophy and calls it 'the experience of nothingness.'[17] Some of the techniques used to socialize individuals into this form of relativistic 'ethos' include sensitivity training. Gestalt therapy, the 'do your own thing' spirit and many liberal and radical 'anti-authoritarian' programs and movements. Both the value-free curricula

and the value-clarification approach are examples of this form of education. Students are encouraged to think through topics for themselves where the solutions are of equal value and no one can legitimately pass judgment on them. Emphasis here lies on individual freedom, healthy spontaneous growth and tolerance of other individuals and cultures.

> "The absolute relativistic approach makes the person either supreme or at least central, de-emphasizing the structure and organization of the environment and the external world and asserts that it is right and necessary that the individual assert himself, find his own way, construct reality on his or her own terms and recognize that there are no absolute values."[18]

In a partial confirmation of this view, Carl Rogers has pointed out that in his psychotherapeutic work with patients, he observed certain kinds of tendencies of valuing in the mature person which includes an 'organismic' basis for an intrinsic valuing process within the individual. Rogers has observed that, "both personal and social values emerge as natural, and experienced, when the individual is close to his own organismic valuing process," and suggests that "an organismic valuing base might exist within the person which will prove to be an organized, adaptive and social approach to the perplexing value issues which face all of us."[19]

The fourth approach, the 'Organismic-Structural-Developmental' approach to values-education, is based on a 'different' view of man, the environment and the relationship between them than the other views discussed so far. Relatively new as an approach to values its historical roots can be traced back to the mind-body dichotomy in the history of philosophy. Stewart defines 'organismic' as the study of man as a functional whole rather than the Cartesian view which splits

man into two parts, body and mind, or the 'Wundtian' view which sees man as a series of sense perceptions and various forms of sensations or even the Skinnerian perspective which sees man as dependent on certain 'environments' to develop certain kinds of behaviour. Organismic theorists perceive man as intrinsically activist and motivated and reject the idea that explanation of man's activity and motivation must be drawn from external sources. It is the very nature of life to be active, to seek self-realization or self-actualization, to be dynamic. In this view, man plays an active energetic and constructive role in forming his own values and in his active relationship with the environment. Stewart uses the term 'transactional' to distinguish it from 'interactional' which is based on an overly simplistic model of human relationships.

> 'The individual is structured by and structures the environment in his own terms in the complex relationship that exists between them. The organismic relationship with the environment is a selective-reflective one in which certain feelings, activities and elements are evaluated as being useful and valuable and others as not.'[20]

Thus, regardless of the kind of environment available, the human organism operates within the environment in terms of its own structures, processes and input. The idea of an 'objective' 'expert' position can not logically exist since each individual transforms his own experiences of reality into the structure which he possesses. In the same way, the possibility that a group or an individual can apprehend reality so well that they can define it and establish it as 'the reality' for others is impossible since no such situation can

ever exist in an organismic view of mankind. The organismic view stresses that individuals are always translating 'objective reality' into their own terms.

At the very heart of the organismic views of values-education is the term 'structure'. This term, which has been used extensively by the cultural anthropologist Levi-Strauss, refers to the intrinsic properties which certain organisms seem to possess which permit them to be distinguished from other types of organisms. Though structure as used in anthropology refers to linguistic and societal patterns, for the purpose of describing the 'organismic' form of values-education 'structure' refers to the kind of thinking which precludes giving an answer to a difficult ethical issue, i.e. some form of 'thought organization' behind cognitively oriented statements. Stewart points out that:

> "...a structure is an organizational thought-pattern that undergoes transformation in its relationship with the environment, but operates in a self-regulating way in order to maintain continuity, stability and equilibrium both in itself and the organism. The transformation that structures undergo are equilibrated or dynamically balanced and self-regulated in increasingly more complex integrated and effective ways with maturation, experience and transaction with the environment."[21]

The implications of this kind of conceptualization for a new kind of values-education lies in the fact that a values-education curriculum must be totally cognizant and sensitive to the level of structural complexity of the child before an attempt is made to 'teach' values or consider ethical and moral issues. As structural properties in the brain increase and as the organism matures so can the curricula include concepts which can only be understood at a proceeding stage.

The Organismic-Structural Developmental view in its analysis of human cognitive and moral development has demonstrated that there is some underlying universality in the manner which man structures his social experience and assumes social perspective. 'Looking at acts' can lead only to a narrow view of values. Looking at the theory behind these acts (structures) might lead to an understanding of the basic universality of structures, process and development.[23] In contemporary philosophical thinking Lawson has tried to create a framework for the teaching of values based upon an analysis of four writers: Adler, Dewey, Sullivan and Fromm. After an examination of each of these writers he tries to show that in this historical development from idealism to social psychology "a general shift or sweep has been described from a focus upon the ideal to one upon the actual, from sources of moral insight independent of experiences to sources which are sought within concrete social situations."[24] In Lawson's view psychological data concerned with the nature of human nature and human interest can act as a critical agent of existing principles thus allowing philosophers and teachers of values to discover whether such principles are congruent with the nature of man. As well, psychological data about motivation and 'learning theory' can produce a critique of educational programs which attempt to teach moral principles. Certainly, criticizing moral principles from the standpoint of empirical knowledge of man is warranted. In Lawson's view moral educators should strive to develop awareness which urges man to examine his motives as well as the consequences of behaviour, and to examine alternative views of life while developing an appreciation of various lifestyles. According to Lawson, social psychology has permitted us to grasp educational

educational objectives from their empirical studies on human nature. These five aspects of 'moral ideals' include awareness, dignity, responsibility and a capacity for reason and love.

Closely related to Lawson's analysis, the philosopher Phenix has attempted to sketch a theory of values-education which is relevant to a society in a state of social and cultural turmoil. Phenix's conception of the 'anomic' position is similar to Stewart's relativist position which states that in a time of widespread cultural change, where persons become anxious and discontented, a real prevalence of apathy appears. An 'anomic' theory of values can never have any educational significance since it denies the meaning of the universe and is destructive of human action. A more constructive position lies in the 'autonomic' outlook which suggests that there are norms and values which are dependent on those individuals who make them. This kind of relativistic position is quite similar in some respects to Stewart's position and Phenix states that scientific studies of culture have given great credence to this theory. If the autonomic theory is followed, however, it is pointless to teach people how to act since all moral decision is thus defined by political strategy. In stark contrast to this theory, Phenix suggests another view called the 'teleonomic' which suggests that there are objective standards of values "that promote clear and concise norms of judgment for human conduct."[25] In this theory people do not create values but rather discover them where "moral demand is grounded in a comprehensive purpose or 'telos' that is objective and normative, but that forever transcends concrete institutional embodiment or ideological formulation."[26]

Phenix suggests that this search for values be based on a tentative, open-minded approach to social and philosophical problems. Individuals must truly become 'learners' and begin to participate in a 'dialogue' where differing perspectives are shared on many complex issues. The role of the school in this form of 'moral instruction' is "to develop skills in moral deliberation through bringing to bear on concrete personal and social problems the relevant perspectives drawn from a variety of specialized disciplines."[27] The most important criterion for this kind of values-education is that it provide a whole range of perspectives, social, aesthetic, economic, religious, to bear on significant issues from the specialized disciplines. Education must be organized to include both multi-disciplinary programs on social and personal issues and specialized disciplinary exploration.*

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* Philip Rieff's virtuoso defense of 'intellectual education' against the hordes of invading barbarians in Fellow Teachers is a brilliant polemic on the evils of the 'therapeutic' and 'moral educator' but it fails to distinguish rational pedagogical development from education faddism. In so doing he hardly does service to his beloved 'subject matter'. For without continuous transformation and recreation all things die (including the liberal arts). However, Rieff's views are highly relevant to a recent concern in educational circles with 'moral' development.

I am not convinced that educators should be concerned with moral development as a distinct educational goal. Rather, morality in humanities and social science education should mean that a subject has been taught in the most critical, comprehensive and nonpartisan manner possible.

Pedagogical Models of Values-Education

Though the kind of theoretical work on values-development mentioned in the previous section is still at a relatively 'primitive' level, actual teaching strategies for values-education already exist.[28] This state of affairs exists because the need for 'effective' and 'modern' pedagogical techniques by teachers is so great that 'approaches' have been created without necessarily waiting for 'scientific' evidence to substantiate a given practice. Thus, the field of values-education is not a neatly developed systematic model where one theoretical discovery leads to an actual implementation or where implementation leads to new discovery, which in turn enhances the previous model. Rather, values-education at this stage is a field where a variety of approaches seem to exist quite independently of each other. Some of the most significant approaches within a North American context include:

1) The Values-Clarification Appreach
2) The Kohlberg Moral Development Approach
3) The Allen Environmental-Moral Reasoning Model
4) The Coombs-Meux Moral Reasoning Model

The Values-Clarification Approach is probably the best known and most utilized values-education technique in existence. Most of the underlying theory of this approach is based on the principle that students are living in a world which is highly confusing, where traditional values are being constantly questioned. The Values-Clarification approach is therefore an attempt to 'personalize' education,[29] so that students' actual feelings, needs and life-goals

play a role in their educational development. Much of it is based on Rath's book Values and Teaching which in turn was heavily influenced by John Dewey's theories on 'valuation and actions'. Specifically, this approach is based on a psychological model of human development where 'self-actualization' and 'personal growth' are treated as important variables. The actual process of values-clarification is based upon the personal life experiences of students, utilized by the teacher to help him discover each student's incipient values. Various clarifying responses are used to help the student develop these 'incipient' values into 'true' values. According to Raths a fully-formed value must fulfil the test of seven criteria. A fully formed value must be:

1) freely chosen,
2) from among many alternatives,
3) the consequences of which must be fully explained,
4) prized and cherished,
5) publicly approved,
6) acted upon in daily life,
7) repeated.[30]

Many kinds of teaching strategies exist to assist the teacher in helping students to clarify and develop their own values into 'true' values which will meet the seven criteria. These range from utilizing values-clarification approaches within school subjects such as English, Mathematics, History, Science, Home Economics, Health and Sex Education to actual value-development within the family unit using various 'dinner-table' learning approaches and other devices. Values-clarification can also be used as a technique in various forms of organizational-

development and group dynamics.[31]

The teacher's role in the values-clarification process is that of creating an atmosphere of trust and security where he acts as a facilitator or discussant rather than as an authority or leader; he must always consider and present alternative ways of thinking where contradictions between beliefs and action are becoming apparent. The expected result of this approach where students are treated as individuals, is that the students will all move towards embracing similar moral principles such as kindness, compassion, self-knowledge, sensitivity to others, etc.[32]

Though values-education has gained a large number of adherents and is practised in thousands of schools in North America, some serious objections have been levied against it. Rokeach has suggested that there are some significant flaws in the basic premises behind value-clarification. Most significantly, Rokeach observes that values-clarification's insistence on 'values-neutrality' is mythical, since its high regard for the seven criteria previously mentioned are real value objectives in themselves. "Is it not value-obfuscating rather than value-clarifying to teach such values through the back door and at the same time give the impression of value-neutrality through the front door?"[33] Rokeach further suggests that actual substantive values-education and making students aware of their own values should be practised in the schools, in addition to the simpler values-clarification practices.

Stewart's criticisms of values-clarification are somewhat more extensive than Rokeach's. Stewart points out that while value-

clarification deals with the 'content' of values within the process of valuing, it ignores the most significant aspect of the issue, the structure of values and valuing, particularly structural development. Stewart suggests that many of the so-called benefits of values-clarification occur from 'peer pressures' where only the strongest personalities among a group of teenagers would be courageous enough to affirm their opinions.[34] At the same time Stewart criticizes values-clarification for its stand on moral issues, since if all values are considered to be similar and relative to each other (as in values-clarification), there can be no hierarchy of moral values. Stewart is also highly critical of any research findings in this area and points out that many of the studies on this subject are based on highly subjective and biased research designs.[35] Moreover, at this time, research in this area presents so many problems that most conclusions cannot be taken seriously.

The second major framework for the teaching of values arises from Kohlberg's work at the Harvard University Moral Education Project. According to Kohlberg there are certain universal moral stages which all people in all cultures go through. From Dewey's postulations of these levels of moral development, the pre-moral or pre-conventional levels, the conventional and the autonomous level and Piaget's experimental work with children involving the pre-moral, the heteronomous and autonomous stages, Kohlberg evolved certain principles which lie at the basis for his own thinking about values and moral development. These principles are:

1) Stages are structural wholes or organized systems of

thought which permit an individual to make consistent judgments about moral issues.

2) Stages are points in a sequence, an invariant sequence where movement is always forward, never backward, to the next higher stage in the sequence. Stages are defined as responses on a verbal moral dilemma scale, moral dilemmas presented to students, mainly in personal interviews. In these dilemmas which individuals are asked to consider. Kohlberg postulates ten universal moral values. These are:

1) Punishment
2) Property
3) Roles and concern of affection
4) Roles and concern of authority
5) Law
6) Life
7) Liberty
8) Distributive justice
9) Truth
10) Sex

For Kohlberg a moral choice involves choosing between two (or more) of these values as they conflict in concrete situations of choice.[36] Depending on the stage or structure of an individual's moral judgment we can surmise what he finds valuable and why he finds it valuable. Six stages are postulated. For example, in Stage I life has a value for its possessions and the person involved. Stage 2 for its usefulness in satisfying needs of the individuals in question; Stage 3 in terms of individuals' relations with others; Stage 4 in terms of social and religious law. In Stages 5 and 6 each life is considered to be intrinsically worthwhile.

The key objective of Kohlberg's cognitive developmental theory is to stimulate movement from one level to the next without

actual indoctrination. In contrast to a values-clarification approach, Kohlberg restricts his educational effort on values to the concept of 'justice'. According to him, the public school should only attempt values education in regard to an awareness of justice or of the rights of others in the Constitutional system. Thus much of Kohlberg's work is concerned with the development of this sense of justice through actual pedagogical techniques and educational structures. Moral discussion usually involves:

1) Exposure to the next higher stage of reasoning.

2) Exposure to situations suggesting problems and contradictions for the child's moral structure. The outcome leads from dissatisfaction with the state presented in the problem to a higher level of value formation.

3) Creating an atmosphere of trust and dialogue.[37]

Though Kohlberg has been a major influence on contemporary values-education, he has his share of critics. Peters points out that Kohlberg's 'biased' view of universal moral stages is uni-dimensional and neglects to consider different ways of achieving the principle of justice. There is a failure to grasp that a utilitarianism (in which the principle of justice is problematic) is an 'alternative' type of morality and that other people, such as Winch, have found a moral of 'integrity' in which the principle of universalization is problematic.[38] For Peters, Kohlberg's idea of morality is just <u>one</u> view of the moral development process and other substantial positions exist. Peters is also most concerned that for the mases of citizens a solid exposure to Stage 3 and 4 (a conventional morality) might be necessary if society

is to function smoothly, since everyone cannot be expected to incorporate the highly complex higher stages into the developed personality.

One of the serious objections to Kohlberg's Moral Development approach, however, must be that it is unrealistic to hope that teachers are able to be continuously just 'one level' higher than each student in classroom discussions since, for a given number of students, too many separate stages are found to be present. At the same time is it realistic to assume that teachers themselves have reached this final level of moral development? In addition Kohlberg's serious neglect of 'affective' education variables (guilt, personal feeling, anxiety) has also created a rather 'lopsided' view of the nature of moral judgment. Moral development is seen more as an actual 'intellectual' enterprise rather than a real personal conflict within an individual to come to terms with important values conflicts.

Another major criticism of Kohlberg's theory of moral development has come from the University of Minnesota psychologist Rest. In a recent paper given at the Values-Education Conference in Oakville, February 1975, Rest argues that even though cognitive development theory has been 'a substantial research base,'[39] Kohlberg has 'overrepresented' his findings concerning shifts in moral stages from one level to the next. Rest points out that 'longitudinal' change by itself is not sufficient evidence to establish the validity of a test of moral judgment.[40] Conceivably, people are changing their 'level' of cognitive sophistication not because (as the cognitive developmentalists would like to claim) new cognitive capacities are allowing them to achieve 'higher' forms of reasoning, but rather because changes in

the child's social environment reflect new modelling and reinforcement contingencies. Hence, since parents talk differently to a four-year-old than to an adolescent cognitive changes must inevitably occur.[41] Rest suggests that many 'alternate' evaluative mechanisms are required to fully explore the implications of Kohlberg's moral development stages.

One of the most highly developed models of actual values-education is Allen's work at the University of Florida. As one of the few value educators to actually state value objectives rather than just deal with 'moral stages' and 'clarification', his work answers some of Rokeach's objectives that schools deal with conflicting educational objectives.[42] In his work on environmental education Allen suggests that the following values should be the probable outcome of a values programme.

1) Reciprocity, Equality and Universality. This means that students will identify with others' interests and feelings akin to the Spinozian moral imperative. The moral person wants nothing for himself that he does not want for all others.

2) Empathy. This suggests that one develops insights into one's feelings, motives, intentions, as well as having a great deal of knowledge about one's own self.

3) Factual Knowledge. Here the student masters factual knowledge and 'scientifically' sound knowledge of human behaviour involving facts, concepts, generalizations, biases.

4) Social Ethical Principles. This means being able to use the three components above to formulate values and value principles

which are related to the way societies function. Here the individual lives according to some consistent guiding principles which he believes in.

5) Personal Ethical Principles. This refers to the ability to use the three components for a rational assessment of a set of rules and value principles related to one's own life and interest. Those rules must be linked by the person's interaction with others.

6) Moral Judgments and Resolutions. This means that the student has the ability to translate moral principles into moral judgments and evaluations in specific interests.

7) Actions. This means being able to integrate all rules in numbers 4, 5 and 6 into actual concrete situations. Here the person translates his values constantly into actions and lifestyle.[43]

Allen's conception of values-education is a much broader and more pedagogically useful one than Kohlberg's, since it suggests that 'moral reasoning' is but one aspect of value-development. At the same time Allen has linked much of these value-skills to the actual curriculum (specifically environmental issues) and has developed a model which students can apply to value issues.

Some very intense work on moral reasoning is presently being carried out at various universities in the U.S. and Canada. In the National Council of Social Studies Yearbook (1971) Donald Coombs and Milton Meux argue for specific strategies for teaching skills of 'value-analysis' which will assist students in making their most critical decisions, as well as helping them to develop skills which will allow them to resolve value conflict between themselves and other

members. According to these authors, students must carry out six tests before their objectives can be met. These are:

1) Identifying and clarifying the value question.

2) Assembling purported facts.

3) Assessing the truth of purported facts.

4) Clarifying the relevance of facts.

5) Arriving at a tentative value decision.

6) Testing the value principle implied in the decision.

Coombs and Meux suggest a series of ways whereby students can learn to identify or clarify value questions. Teachers must play an active role in these deliberations by asking leading questions which clarify the question further. In the next stage students must learn some of the academic skills necessary to assemble the necessary 'facts' on a given value issue. Teachers should be particularly concerned with helping students distinguish 'factual' from 'evaluative' assertions and not mistake value assertions for factual ones. An interesting technique which could be used here is a 'fact-assembly' chart where students can list positive and negative facts about a 'fact' as well as their own personal concerns.[44] As well, students can learn techniques of 'fact criticism' by using asked questions, such as:

1) How do you know this is true?

2) What evidence is there to conclude that this is true?

3) Do other authorities agree with what he says?

They must also learn to utilize facts which are'relevant' to the case. Here students can use an 'evidence card' which allows them to distinguish between what the relationship is between a value judgment

and a fact. Coombs and Meux also suggest some very interesting techniques which could make students aware of some of the value implications of their choices. Some of the techniques suggested include the subsumption test, the role exchange test, and the Universal Consequence Test.[45] In this procedure students are challenged to consider the implications of their value decisions for individuals who might be affected by them or by the student himself in a context where this value was being applied, and even in a given 'Kantian' 'moral imperative' where a value decision is seen as linked to consequences for all individuals universally.

One of the important theoretical components in Coombs' and Meux's work is the whole area of ego development theory which suggests that the ability to perform value analysis is quite similar to certain levels of 'ego functions' which have been researched by the psychologist Jane Loevinger. According to this theory 'capability for formulating a fully rational value judgment is according to ego development theory achieved only at the highest stage of ego development.' Loevinger herself believes that the very process of moral conflict is 'education' and has suggested that "it is not the answer but the questions asked that both show and stimulate moral development."[46] Loevinger and her associates are presently attempting to create an evaluative mechanism which will actually measure ego and moral development among individuals.

Though Meyer mentions a proliferation of values-education centres and exponents throughout North America and Western Europe[47] little consideration has been given to a classifying system which might begin to distinguish between all the different types of values education presently being offered. However, it seems that at present

certain basic approaches in the field exist which set them apart.

1) The Moral Development Approach is the most widely used approach which actually strives to raise the level of moral development of a student by using various 'hypothetical' dilemmas. This model is psychologically oriented and is based on creating some movement towards a higher level of stage development.

2) The Affective-Personal Growth Approach is closely tied to a whole body of 'affective' or 'humanistic' education which also deals with student values but as a by-product of an intrinsic educational concern with personal growth, inner-personal development, self-assertion and self-knowledge. The Values-Clarification Approach and various forms of Humanistic Education play a significant theoretical and practical role in the major bulk of techniques used.

3) The Moral Reasoning-Social Studies Approach closely resembles a traditional 'intellectual' type of education where students learn certain types of skills in value-analysis and apply these skills in various forms of critical thinking.

4) The Programmatic-Problem Centred Approach allows students to actively focus their attention on certain key issues which might affect their lives such as ecological issues and the 'emerging future'. (The author is himself presently involved in developing a form of values-education called 'Values-Reconstruction' which might be appropriate for junior college and undergraduate courses in the humanities and Social Sciences.)

In 1969 the first English-language CEGEP (College of General and Professional Education) was established at Dawson College in

Montreal and here the author first developed a course in the category 'Man and his World Views' which was an attempt to create a form of substantive values-education based on some of the writings of Stewart and Rokeach. Much of the actual theory behind the course came from a reading of the 'humanistic psychologists' and philosophers (particularly Fromm and Maslow) who had pointed out in many of their writings how a 'breakdown' in values was taking place in contemporary Western society while most aware individuals were searching for new symbols, new forms of identification and new values. Thus, (in 1971 - 72) a course structure emerged which permitted students to think about the nature of human values in a changing society by reflecting on and discussing the ideas of important philosophers, psychologists, theologians and artists such as Martin Buber, Bertrand Russell, A.N. Whitehead, Jean-Paul Sartre and Paul Tillich. The basic teaching methodology consisted of allowing students to choose 'key' ideas from short writings by these authors and by discussing (in seminar style fashion) the significance of these ideas for their own lives. In addition, most students kept a journal which consisted of daily entries and which sought to link their own feelings and perceptions with the ideas of the course, as well as their own reactions to various discussions and readings. The theme of the course and the potential significance for decision-making in their own lives was carefully analyzed.

Course evaluations were carried out at the end of each three-month semester between 1971 and 1973. It became quite evident that:

1) Even though students represented a wide range of intellectual abilities and reading skills, they expressed a deep and

consistent interest in the course content and format.

2) Most students were enthusiastic about the idea of the journal, which many believed helped them to integrate their experiences in the course. It would be safe to assume that students wrote at least twice as much during the term as they would have done in a 'traditional type' humanities course.

3) Many students were motivated to continue reading in certain areas and requested that the course be extended into a following term.

Based on these very encouraging conclusions, the author then engaged in a systematic attempt to read on all aspects of 'values' from philosophical, sociological, psychiatric and religious perspectives with a view to developing an integrated multi-credit programme in the area of values-education. In line with the author's reading and arising from interaction with students, the course went through various structural and pedagogical changes (where some of the ideas of the 'affective' educators such as Weinstein and Brown began to play a prominent role) and serious consideration was given to the possibility that this type of course structure might have some significant 'mental-health' implications on students' self-perception and personal awareness and growth. Some of the psychologically oriented ideas were incorporated in an article published at this time (1972).[48] Requests for further information has led to discussions with members of a variety of university departments of humanities, psychology and social work, as well as psychiatric hospitals and mental health centres, which in turn has had an effect upon subsequent course preparation. Specifically, the author

began to give serious consideration to the actual psychological implications of 'substantive' values-education for a student's personal and intellectual development. Rokeach's studies on values assisted the author considerably in coming to grips with the socio-psychological implications of values-education as well as helping him to frame numerous ideas for new techniques which involved 'confronting' students with contradictions in their own value-systems. The major content of the course focused on the following areas:

1) Values and Self-Knowledge

Here the student was given the Rokeach Values Inventory and asked to list eighteen institutional and terminal values. Discussions on the reasons for various choices took place between small groups. Students were asked to reflect on some pointed questions concerning their life goals, their formative influences and their vocational aspirations. Some theoretical discussion on the acquisition of values, attitudes and beliefs took place based on some of the work of Allport, Rogers and Rokeach.

2) Values in Technological Society

Here an attempt was made to carry out a critical analysis of certain aspects of contemporary industrial society by discussing Jules Henry's book Culture Against Man in terms of the student's perceptions and experiences. Seminars on writings of the contemporary family, educational structures, economic values and the sub-culture of adolescence and the aged took place.

3) Psychoanalytic View on Human Nature

In this section students were expected to read some of the

basic writings and critiques of Freud, Erickson and Horney. The role of the unconscious, perceived familial influences and various psychological theories about human behaviour were discussed and critically analyzed in light of modern scientific findings and behaviouristic theories as explicated by B.F. Skinner. Students were made conscious of the controversy surrounding various views of human development and 'consciousness' existing in the contemporary social scientific world.

4) Existential Theory

Students were introduced to the basic ideas of Sartre's article on 'Atheistic Existentialism' where he attempts to summarize the basic position of this form of existentialism and the implications of this philosophy on the individual's life. Religious beliefs and attitudes are discussed in light of Freud's writings in Future of an Illusion and Totem and Taboo.

5) Humanistic Views on Development

In this final section students are asked to read and discuss the basic ideas of Maslow, particularly the concept of self-actualization. Discussion on the 'humanistic' view that higher order values come out of the experience of the individual took place and students were asked to look within their own persons for any evidence of this theory.

In addition, to the reading of Jules Henry and outlines on the ideas of the 'psychoanalytic' thinkers and some humanistic psychologists, students can elect to write a research paper on the ideas of one major contemporary thinker in the area of human values. Papers have been written on Freud, Jung, Erickson, Buber and Maritain. At the very end of the course, students are asked to re-examine their original

reactions to the Rokeach Value Survey and attempt to explain any of the differences which might have taken place. Further reading on areas of interest and suggestions for 'related' courses are made to the students.

One of the major priorities which is necessary for the future development of this kind of 'substantive' values-education is to acquire certain kinds of evaluative mechanisms which can clarify the kinds of changes in values and attitudes which students might be undergoing. What kinds of subject area concerns are most likely to motivate students to 'higher' levels of intellectual application? What kinds of students are most affected by which aspect of the course? How does 'keeping a log' actually affect a student's self-concept or perception of the world around him? Do any of the curriculum areas discussed in the course affect a student's attitudes towards his family, his future occupation and even his political views?

Towards a Value-Based Pedagogy of Cultural Transformation

One of the significant manifestations which points in the direction of a 'value-based pedagogy' in the future is the upheaval which is presently taking place in our modern conceptions of 'scientific thinking' concerning 'value-free' versus 'value-laden', 'subjectivity' versus 'objectivity'. This major controversy in the philosophy of science which has had implications for most of the social sciences has created a whole series of issues which might totally radicalize the teaching of the humanities and social sciences. The seminal work on this conflict between those who see science as being based on an 'objective' model of society and those who see scientific work to be invariably based upon personal and societal variants including values, feelings, needs, was Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In this volume Kuhn tried to show how what is considered to be 'scientific thinking' proceeded from paradigms, which were accepted by a majority of scientists working in a field. As the paradigm shifted and changed almost imperceptibly, new pieces of information, speculation and historical events almost invariably affected the model, so that eventually a 'new' model arose which then again became the institutional order of things until a 'new' challenge arose. Kuhn's theory showed quite clearly how significant human passions and societal events were in the development of scientific thinking and pointed the way for a greater involvement of observer's values in the scientific process.[49]

Since the time of Max Weber this debate between 'value-free' and 'value-laden' sociology has been carried out between noted socio-

logists and philosophers of science. According to Gouldner, when a social scientist thinks that he has made a choice he has merely come to it through the basis of some moral value. According to him "one cannot be objective about the world outside without, to some extent, being knowledgeable about (and in control of) ourselves. In normative objectification one of the central problems is to know our values and to see that such knowledge is problematic."[50] Sociological education must become much more a form of values-education where potential social scientists learn how to articulate, classify and understand the limitations and problems created by their own value perceptions. Unless sociologists can perceive that their studies of industrial society invariably force them into the position of assuming that the 'status quo' of bureaucracy, institutional goods and services are only one form of social reality, sociology will be largely a form of 'liberal market research'. Gouldner strongly suggests that "it is to values, not to functions that sociologists must give their most basic commitments."[51]

Some theoretical work has already begun on the premise that 'scientific' work requires a value position at its very inception and Eckhardt has suggested that all scientific inquiry be conducted with a view to making the value of 'compassion' its major focus. According to him, "the general value of compassion can and should become a norm in relation to which all other values, theories and facts in the social sciences can and should be evaluated as to their adequacy, their authenticity and their contribution toward human development."[52] At the compassionate level, truth is whatever serves the purpose of changing

minds and societies in the direction of compassion within an equitable distribution of values among all human beings as far as this is humanly possible.[53] In like view to Gouldner, Eckhardt reaffirms Hartman's view that all facts are "frozen values" when "all scientific truth is a matter of correspondence with certain values, some of which have been transformed into facts by social convention."[54] In his analysis of different types of personalities, Eckhardt has noted that authoritarian political and educational structures both play a major role in developing highly compulsive attitudes and behaviour, while a 'liberal' or 'value-free' and 'objective' educational system facilitates conformist attitudes and behaviour. Eckhardt hypothesizes that a 'radical' form and content should probably produce more compassionate attitudes and behaviours and suggests that educational activities such as discussions, where the individual can participate more fully, or critical reading and analysis do lead to important changes in attitudes and behaviour.[55]

From all academic disciplines a 'new' vision of man is being created with enormous implications for educational practices and pedagogical approaches. Maslow's work represents a major attempt to create a "humanistic" science based on the intrinsic 'goodness' of man and his research on self-actualization suggests that the Freudian vision of the conflict of society's demands against the evil and anarchistic impulses of the individual 'id' is a faulty model since the 'self-actualizing' individual will invariably choose what is good for society. Thus, the major concern of those involved in educational management or political enterprises is to create the environmental

conditions whereby the individual can develop in a way which is self-actualizing. To Maslow and the school of humanistic psychology, knowledge of self through value-awareness, 'clarification' and 'confrontation' must become major educational objectives within a humanistic educational process.[56] Even modern neuro-science has shown that 'subjective experience' plays a significant role in the process of intellectual judgment and threatens the behaviorist position of an organism subject only to various forms of conditioning patterns.

> "As a dynamic emergent property of cerebral excitation, subjective experience acquires causal potency and becomes a causal determinant in brain function. Although inseparably tied to the material brain process, it is something distinct and special in its own right, "different from and more than" its component physiochemical elements."[57]

Sperry suggests that this 'revised' interpretation of the brain will lead to a swing "in psychology and neuro-science away from hardcore materialism and reductionism toward a new, more acceptable brand of mentalism...to restore to the scientific image of human nature some of the dignity, freedom and other humanistic attributes of which it had been deprived by the behavioristic approach."[58] At the University of Rochester William Pinar and his associates are intensely exploring this phenomonological field of the 'Self' and the implications of 'heightened consciousness' for the development of curriculum theory and educational processes.[59] Pinar strongly suggests that curriculum theorists study the 'inner self' through logs, biographies, dreams and analysis of subconscious states where the relationship of 'subjective perception' to the external world would be paramount.

Ernest Beacker's penetrating vision of 'Post-scientistic' man pointed to a cultural rebirth where "the twentieth century will go down

in history as the age when man first consciously saw the desirability of throwing off the automatic bond in which he holds himself via culture"[60] and where 'human authenticity' lies precisely in rejecting the excessive constraint of early environment in liberating oneself from its fetters.[61] For Becker, modern man must learn to reject those cultural traditions which stand in the way of his development and ultimately his actual survival on this planet. Values-education might be one process which can play an important role in contributing to the transcendence of man over those cultural traditions which threaten his existence.

FOOTNOTES

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